Le paradoxe du maître-chanteur: théorie des jeux et négociations avec les pays arabes

"The political relationship between Israel and Arab countries is also conducted according to the principles of this paradox. The Arabs present rigid and unreasonable opening positions at every negotiation. They convey confidence and assurance in their demands, and make certain to make absolutely clear to Israel that they will never give up on any of these requirements."

Le paradoxe du maître chanteur - Théorie des jeux et négociations avec les pays arabes, par l'Israélien Robert Aumann qui a reçu le prix Nobel d'économie pour "avoir amélioré notre compréhension des mécanismes de conflit et de coopération par l'analyse de la théorie des jeux."

Source: Solomonia - A lire absolument.

A must-read from Israeli-American Nobelist Robert Aumann: The Blackmailer Paradox - Game Theory and negotiations with Arab countries. Here's the scenario:

Reuben and Shimon are placed into a small room with a suitcase containing $100,000 of cash. The owner of the suitcase offers them the following: "I'll give you all the money in the suitcase, but only on the condition that you negotiate and reach an amicable agreement on its division. That's the only way I will give you the money."

Reuben, who is a rational person, appreciates the golden opportunity presented to him and turns to Shimon with the obvious suggestion: "Come, you take half the amount, I'll take the other half, and each of us will go away with $50,000." To his surprise, Shimon, with a serious look on his face and a determined voice says: "Listen, I do not know what your intentions are with the money, but I'm not leaving this room with less than $90,000. Take it or leave it. I'm fully prepared to go home with nothing."

Reuben can not believe his ears. What happened to Shimon? he thinks to himself. Why should he get 90%, and I only 10%? He decides to try to talk to Shimon. "Come, be reasonable," he pleads. "We're both in this together, and we both want the money. Come let's share the amount equally and we'll both come out ahead."

But the reasoned explanation of his friend does not seem to register on Shimon. He listens attentively to Reuben's words, but then declares even more emphatically, "There is nothing to discuss. 90-10 or nothing, that's my final offer!" Reuben's face turns red with anger. He wants to smack Shimon across his face, but soon reconsiders. He realizes that Shimon is determined to leave with the majority of the money, and that the only way for him to leave the room with any money is to surrender to Shimon's blackmail. He straightens his clothes, pulls out a wad of bills from the suitcase in the amount of $10,000, shakes hands with Shimon and leaves the room looking forlorn.

This case in Game Theory is called the "Blackmailer Paradox." The paradox emerging from this case is that the rational Reuben is eventually forced to act clearly irrationally, in order to gain the maximum available to him. The logic behind this bizarre result is that Shimon broadcast total faith and confidence in his excessive demands, and he is able to convince Reuben to yield to his blackmail in order for him to receive the minimum benefit...

How does this apply to the Arab-Israeli conflict?

The political relationship between Israel and Arab countries is also conducted according to the principles of this paradox. The Arabs present rigid and unreasonable opening positions at every negotiation. They convey confidence and assurance in their demands, and make certain to make absolutely clear to Israel that they will never give up on any of these requirements.

Be sure to read the rest.

The trouble for Israel in applying the lessons of this thought experiment is that they have not only their own fifth column, but so-called "friends" in the governments of other countries and lobbying groups like J Street who basically take Shimon's part in the negotiation.